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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW,
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW, AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY
1.

Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment for

appellee Brad Fullmer (hereinafter "Fullmer") and denying partial
summary judgment for appellants (hereinafter "Garbett") on the
grounds that Garbett's insurer, State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company ("State Farm") could not maintain this subrogation action
because Fullmer, a tenant of Garbett's, was an implied co-insured
under State Farm's fire insurance policy?
Standard of Review:

In reviewing the granting of summary

judgment, the court views the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the losing party.
Because a summary judgment resolves only questions of law, the
court gives no deference to the trial court's legal determinations
and affirms only if the decision was correct as a matter of law.
Retherford v. AT&T Communications,

P.2d

, 201 U.A.R.

21 (Utah 1992), and cases cited therein. The court may reconsider
the trial court's legal conclusions. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813
P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
2.

Did the district court err in striking paragraphs 5 and

6 of David Houston's affidavit and in refusing to strike portions
of paragraphs 3 and 5 of Fullmer's May 14, 1992, affidavit?

1

Standard

of

Review:

Affidavits

must

set

forth

facts

admissible in evidence and must not simply be conclusory in form.
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983); Butterfield v. Okubo,
831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992).

The court must determine whether the

affidavit was made upon personal knowledge and whether the affiant
was competent to testify to the matter stated therein.

Rule 56,

U.R.C.P.; Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985); Howick
v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 498 P.2d 352 (1972).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2.

Utah Code Ann., § 31A-21-108.

The foregoing rule and statute are set forth verbatim and
attached hereto as Addendum 1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Garbett owned

the Wedge Apartments

in St. George, Utah.

Garbett had fire insurance on the apartments with State Farm.

The

apartments were damaged as a result of a fire negligently caused by
Fullmer, one of Garbett's tenants.
loss.

State Farm paid for the fire

This is a subrogation action brought by State Farm in the

name of its insured, Garbett, to recover for the property damage
caused by Fullmer's negligence.
B.

Course of Proceedings
Garbett filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the

issue of liability and causation of damages with the only remaining
issue being the exact amount of damages.
2

Fullmer filed a cross

motion for summary judgment.
48-49, 57, 121-122]

[Record on Appeal, hereinafter R.,

The contested issue on both motions was

whether a subrogation claim could be maintained against the tenant
Fullmer. Garbett argued he was entitled to summary judgment on the
grounds it was undisputed Fullmer had negligently caused the property damage.

[R. 50-58]

Garbett further argued that subrogation

was not barred under Utah law as applied to the facts of this case.
[R. 54-57, 166-177]

Fullmer admitted his negligence caused the

fire and damages, [R. 65-66, 224-225] but asserted State Farm could
not pursue a subrogation claim against him, as a matter of law,
because he was a co-insured under the fire policy issued by State
Farm.

[R. 127-139] The parties presented memoranda and affidavits

in support of and in opposition to the respective motions.
motions were argued to the trial court on July 22, 1992.

The

[R. 118-

119, 213, 248]
C.

Disposition in the Trial Court
Despite recognizing Fullmer was clearly negligent in causing

the fire damage, [R. 251] the trial court denied Garbett's motion
for partial summary judgment, granted Fullmer's motion for summary
judgment, and dismissed Garbett's complaint. The trial court concluded, based on his interpretation of Fashion Place Inv. v. Salt
Lake County, 776 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989), that where the lease
between Garbett and Fullmer was silent regarding the obligation to
provide insurance on the apartment building, then Fullmer, as a
tenant, was presumed to be a co-insured under the State Farm fire
policy. Therefore, the court concluded State Farm was barred from
3

maintaining a subrogation action against Fullmer,

[R. 226, 293]

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment were entered
on August 18, 1992. [Addendum 2 attached hereto] Garbett's Notice
of Appeal was filed on September 8, 1992.

[Addendum 3 attached

hereto]
Although the trial judge based his decision solely on his
legal interpretation of the Fashion Place Inv. case, and did not
rely either on Fullmer's affidavit or on various public policy
arguments raised by Fullmer, [R. 295-296] the court nonetheless
overruled

Garbett's

objections

to

Fullmer1s

May

14, 1992,

affidavit, refusing to strike portions of paragraphs 3 and 5.
163-165, 213, 233, 295-296]

The court also refused to admit

paragraphs 5 and 6 of David Houston's affidavit.
258]

[R.

[R. 218, 233,

In striking paragraphs 5 and 6, the court nonetheless held

that "renter's insurance is available and plaintiffs do not need an
affidavit to establish and argue the availability of renter's
insurance to cover personal property owned by an insured and
liability."

[R. 233, 260-261]

A copy of the Houston Affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum
4. A copy of the Fullmer Affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum
5.

A copy of the trial court's Order Regarding Motions to Strike

is attached hereto as Addendum 6.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On February 9, 1988, Fullmer signed a rental agreement with
Garbett which permitted Fullmer to reside as a tenant in Apartment
A6 of the Wedge Apartments for the winter and spring quarters of
4

the 1987-88 school year in St. George, Utah.

[R. 7, 14, 59, 62-63,

223-224] Pursuant to the terms of the lease, Fullmer was obligated
to pay rent of $335 per quarter.

[R. 62]

Under paragraph 1(b) of the lease, Fullmer agreed that:
Each tenant shall be responsible for all
damages within their apartment on a joint and
several basis. [R. 7, 14, 62, 224]
Under paragraph 4 of the lease, Fullmer agreed that:
No . . . destruction of property (Landlords or
tenants's) shall be permitted on the premises
(apartments, parking lot, sidewalks or lawns).
[R. 7, 14, 62, 224] [Emphasis added]
The lease contained no terms or language which required the
landlord to purchase fire insurance on the apartments.

[R. 62-6 3,

224]
On February 22, 1988, approximately two weeks after Fullmer
signed the lease agreement and while he was residing as a tenant in
the Wedge Apartments, he used a hibachi barbecue at approximately
12:00 noon on the balcony of Apartment A6.

[R. 60, 62-63, 224]

Following the noon barbecue on February 22, 1988, Fullmer left
the coals in the hibachi.

[R. 60, 224]

At approximately 7:00 p.m. on February 22, 1988, Fullmer
prepared the same hibachi for another barbecue on the balcony of
Apartment A6.

In the process, Fullmer dumped the coals remaining

in the hibachi from the noon barbecue in a cardboard box located in
the balcony closet [R. 60, 224], which the trial court described as
"a consummately negligent act."

[R. 251]

5

At approximately

1:00 a.m. on February 23, 1988, a fire

started in the storage area of Apartment A6. The fire was started
by the smoldering coals and ashes negligently placed in the storage
closet by Fullmer.

[R. 7-8, 14, 65-66, 224-225]

Garbett insured

the Wedge Apartments against fire losses

through State Farm. State Farm's insurance policy does not include
tenants

(Fullmer) either as named

definition.

insureds or as insureds by

[R. 68-97, 220-222, *,25]

State Farm paid for the fire loss suffered by Garbett in this
case in an amount in excess of $70,000. This action was brought as
a subrogation claim against Fullmer pursuant to contractual rights
provided under Section I and Section II, General Condition No. 7 of
the insurance policy.

[R. 96, 225] State Farm's subrogation claim

was submitted to Prudential Insurance Company, the home owner's
insurer for Fullmer, through Fullmer's parents' home owner's policy
with Prudential.

Prudential never claimed to State Farm that

Prudential's home owner's policy did not provide liability coverage
for Brad Fullmer.

[R. 217-219]

The lease between the parties is silent on the issue of
insurance,

and there was no discussion between the parties to the

lease regarding insurance.

[R. 62-63, 225]

The lease provides in part that:
It is the intent of the landlord and their
managers to keep The Wedge in superior
condition. [R. 62, 2:5]

6

The fire which is the subject of this action was caused by
Fullmer's negligence.

There was privity of contract between

Garbett and Fullmer with respect to the lease agreement.

[R. 225]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court erred in concluding that a subrogation

action could not be maintained against a tenant who negligently
caused fire damage to the landlord's property even though the lease
agreement did not require the landlord to provide fire insurance on
the property.

The trial court erroneously interpreted Fashion

Place Inv. to confer implied co-insured status on Fullmer under
Garbett's fire insurance policy even though the lease was silent
regarding the obligation to maintain insurance.

In fact, Fashion

Place Inv. held just the opposite, i.e., a tenant was determined to
be an implied co-insured only because the lease agreement expressly
required the landlord to provide fire insurance on the property.
2.

There are three possible circumstances under Utah law

where a subrogation claim against a tenant could be barred: first,
where the lease requires the landlord to obtain fire insurance;
second, where the tenant is a named insured or an insured by
definition under the policy; and third, where the lease agreement
expressly exempts the tenant from liability for negligently caused
fire damage.

None of these circumstances are applicable in the

instant case.

The lease did not require Garbett to maintain fire

insurance, Fullmer was not a named

insured or an insured by

definition under the terms of the policy, and the lease did not
exempt Fullmer from liability for fire damage.
7

Thus, under both

traditional tort and subrogation concepts, this subrogation action
against Fullmer should not have been dismissed.
3.

Public policy arguments espoused in some jurisdictions as

a basis for holding a tenant to be a co-insured solely because he
is a tenant, and thus free from liability on any subrogation
action, should not be adopted by this court.

Such public policy

considerations ignore the basic premises underlying subrogation,
i.e., that the loss should be borne by the party whose negligence
caused it, and that the subrogated insurer's rights are the same as
the rights of its insured.

In the instant case, Garbett clearly

would have a right of action against Fullmer for negligently caused
damage.

These rights should not be barred simply because Fullmer

was a tenant. Courts which have adopted this rationale have based
their conclusions on ill-conceived and/or clearly incorrect factual
and/or legal assumptions. For example, one erroneous assumption is
that allowing subrogation against a tenant will force the property
to be double insured for fire loss.
4.

It is not inequitable for Fullmer to be held responsible

for his own negligence.

Such is the common law rule absent an

express agreement to the contrary.
5.

In the event the Court of Appeals believes an affidavit

is necessary to establish the availability of renter's insurance to
cover tenant's personal liability, then the trial court's striking
of paragraphs 5 and 6 of David Houston's affidavit should be
overruled and the entire affidavit admitted.

8

If no such affidavit

is necessary, then Garbett withdraws his objection to the court's
striking of those paragraphs.
6.

If the Court reverses the trial court's grant of summary

judgment for Fullmer, then the Court should enter partial summary
judgment for Garbett.

The Court should reverse the trial court's

overruling of Garbett's objections to portions of paragraphs 3 and
5 of Fullmer's affidavit regarding his reasonable expectations
about insurance coverage on the building.

Those provisions were

conclusory in nature and did not properly meet the requirements of
Rule 56 for an affidavit. Moreover, reasonable expectations of the
parties is not a basis for establishing co-insured status under
Utah law.

The Utah Supreme Court has rejected the reasonable

expectations doctrine in construing insurance policies. Fullmer's
affidavit does not create any material fact issue which would
preclude the Court of Appeals from ordering entry of partial
summary judgment for Garbett.
ARGUMENT
POINT I,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR FULLMER AND DISMISSING STATE
FARM'S SUBROGATION CLAIM.
The trial court's granting of summary judgment for Fullmer was
based solely on the court's interpretation of Fashion Place Inv.,
Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989), stated as
follows:
Where the lease between these parties was
silent with respect to insurance or any
obligation to provide insurance, the court
9

concludes, based upon the authority of Fashion
Place Inv. v. Salt Lake County, . . . that the
defendant-lessee Fullmer is presumed to be a
co-insured under the landlord's fire insurance
policy and therefore no subrogation action may
be prosecuted against the tenant Fullmer.
[R. 226] Notwithstanding the foregoing conclusion, the trial court
readily acknowledged "there's no question in my mind that this case
needs to go up to the Court of Appeals because I think they have
left a very questionable circumstance in the Fashion Place Inv.
case."

[R. 293]

It is Garbett's position that the trial court misinterpreted
Fashion Place Inv., and in the process adopted a broad concept
barring subrogation against a tenant solely because he is a tenant.
None of the applicable Utah cases have adopted such a concept, and
Garbett urges this Court not to do so.
A.

Utah Law Allows Subrogation Against a Tenant Except in
Three Specific Circumstances, None of Which Are Present
in the Instant Case.

The applicable Utah cases set forth three circumstances in
which a subrogation claim may not be maintained against a negligent
party defendant -- first, where the fire insurance policy includes
the defendant as a named insured or as an insured by definition,
Board of Education of Jordan School Dist. v. Hales, 566 P.2d 1246
(Utah 1977); Fashion Place, Inv., supra; second, where the lease
agreement exempts or excuses the tenant from liability for damages
caused by fire, see Bonneville on the Hill Co. v. Sloane, 572 P.2d
402 (Utah 1977); and third, where the lease agreement specifically

10

requires the landlord to maintain fire insurance, Fashion Place
Inv. v. Salt Lake County, supra.
1.

Tenant Is Named Insured or Insured By Definition,

In Hales, supra, the defendant against whom the subrogation
action was asserted was a subcontractor, and the insurance policy
expressly

stated

that subcontractors on the job were covered

insureds.

The insurer even paid a first-party claim made by the

defendant subcontractor.

Under those circumstances, the Utah

Supreme Court held no subrogation action could be maintained.
Although the defendant in Hales was not a tenant, the principle set
forth is applicable to the instant case.

Fullmer was not a named

insured, nor was he an insured by definition under the State Farm
policy, and therefore State Farm's subrogation claim cannot be
barred on those grounds.
2.

Lease Exempts Tenant's Liability.

In Bonneville, supra, defendant-tenant had a lease agreement
with the landlord which expressly absolved the tenant from damages
caused to the premises by fire. Although the case does not specifically discuss subrogation, it is clear that the landlord obtained
and paid for fire insurance. The Supreme Court held no claim could
be maintained by the landlord against the tenant because of the exculpatory clause in the lease. Since an insurer's rights could be
no greater than the insured's (landlord's), the exculpatory clause
would not only bar the landlord's claim, but also a subrogation
claim of the insurer.

See also Rizzuto v. Morris, 22 Wash. App.

11

951, 592 P.2d 688 (Wash. App. 1979) (court disallowed subrogation
where lease exempted tenant from liability for fire damage).
The Bonneville rule does not apply to Fullmer. The lease with
Garbett does not exempt Fullmer from liability for damages caused
by fire. On the contrary, under paragraph 4 of the lease, Fullmer
expressly agreed that he would not destroy any property, including
the apartments.

He breached that contractual duty by negligently

causing over $70,000 in fire damage to the property.
3•

Lease Requires Landlord to Provide Fire Insurance.

In Fashion Place Inv., the lease specifically required the
landlord to obtain fire insurance on the building.

The court

concluded the tenant was a de facto co-insured under the policy
because of this express requirement for the landlord to purchase
insurance as part of its contractual obligations owed under the
lease to the tenant.

The court stated that

,f

[w]here the insured

[landlord] is required by contract or lease to carry insurance for
the benefit of another, the other party [tenant] may attain the
status of a de facto coinsured even if not named as an insured in
the policy obtained."
There

776 P.2d at 944-45 (emphasis added).

is a reasonable basis for the Fashion Place Inv.

holding, namely that where the landlord has specifically promised
to purchase fire insurance, then that insurance is part of the
consideration to which the tenant is entitled under the terms of
the lease, and the insurance so purchased is intended to cover the
risk of the tenant's negligent acts. However, just like the Hales
and Bonneville holdings, the Fashion Place Inv. rule also does not
12

apply to Fullmer because his lease did not require Garbett, nor did
Garbett ever agree, to provide fire insurance on the apartment
complex.

B.

A Lease Which i s S i l e n t on Insurance Does Not Make
Fullmer a Co-Insured Under S t a t e Farm's F i r e Policy.

The t r i a l

court

recognized

that

no Utah case,

including

Fashion Place I n v . , has ever held a t e n a n t , ( s o l e l y because of his
s t a t u s as a t e n a n t ) , to be a co-insured under a f i r e

insurance

policy obtained by h i s l a n d l o r d .
If the Court of Appeals had intended to adopt such a broad
p r i n c i p l e in Fashion Place I n v . , i t could have e a s i l y said so.
did not. 1

It

The Court's express r e l i a n c e on the language in the

l e a s e requiring the landlord to purchase f i r e insurance as a basis
for denying subrogation shows the limited n a t u r e of the holding.
Yet contrary to t h a t holding, the t r i a l court ruled t h a t a tenant
i s a co-insured when the l e a s e says nothing about insurance.

Thus,

instead of following Fashion Place I n v . , the t r i a l court reached
the exact opposite r e s u l t .
Garbett purchased f i r e insurance to p r o t e c t h i s i n t e r e s t s as
owner of the property, not because of any c o n t r a c t u a l obligation
owed to Fullmer.

If Garbett had not purchased f i r e

insurance,

Fullmer would not have had a claim for breach of c o n t r a c t , but when

In fact, the Court of Appeals clearly identified the issue raised on appeal by Fashion Place was
whether the lease provision requiring the landlord to obtain insurance made the tenant a coinsured. ("Fashion
Place argues on appeal that the t r i a l court erred in ruling that Salt Lake County is a comsured of the
landlord. Fashion Place contends that a lease provision requiring the landlord to provide insurance does not
by itself expressly or impliedly exempt the tenant from the financial consequences of its own negligence." 776
P 2d at 943)

13

Fullmer negligently burned up the building, Garbett could have
maintained an action against Fullmer for damages.

See Cluff v.

Culmer, 556 P. 2d 498 (Utah 1976), confirming the tenant's common
law implied covenant not to damage leased premises, and citing with
approval 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 922 which states:
This implied covenant is as much a part of the
contract of lease as if it were incorporated
into it by express language.
If, by the
negligence . . . of a tenant, the demised
property is materially injured, he is liable
for the resultant damage, and the landlord may
recover the amount thereof from him . . . .
And since this is a subrogation claim, State Farm's rights of
recovery are as great as the landlord's own rights to recover for
damage caused by its tenant. U.S. Fidelity & Guar, v. Let's Frame
It, 759 P.2d 819, 820 (Colo. App. 1988).
Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 31A-21-108,

the

Moreover, pursuant to

legislature

has

expressly

authorized insurers to maintain subrogation actions in the name of
their insureds.
Garbett

submits

the trial court's

legal conclusion

that

Fullmer was a co-insured in the face of a lease silent on insurance
was wrong.

It was not only an incorrect interpretation of Fashion

Place Inv.'s specific holding on subrogation against a tenant, but
also

ignored

the basic concepts underlying

the principle of

subrogation, Specifically, subrogation authorizes the insurer who
paid the loss to step into the shoes of its insured and recoup its
losses from the party whose negligence caused the loss.
Fashion Place Inv., 776 P.2d at 944.

See

This Court can correct the

trial court's error by reversing the entry of summary judgment for
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Fullmer and instructing the trial court to enter partial summary
judgment for Garbett.
C.

Public Policy Does Not Mandate Barring State Farm's
Subrogation Claim,

In a recent decision, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the
landlord's insurer could maintain a subrogation action for fire
damage negligently caused by a tenant. Neubauer v. Hostetter, 485
N.W.2d 87 (Iowa 1992).
Joyce Hostetter

The facts in Neubauer are instructive.

and her husband

rented

a farmhouse from the

Neubauers, who maintained fire insurance on the house. Hostetters
obtained renter's insurance to insure their personal belongings and
to cover them for personal liability. Shortly after acquiring this
policy,

Joyce

Hostetter

negligently

burned

down

the

entire

farmhouse.
Neubauers' fire insurer paid them $22,000 on the loss, and
Neubauers incurred $6,176 in uninsured losses. Neubauers and their
insurer

(Farmers

Mutual)

brought

suit

against

Hostetters.

Hostetter's renters' insurer (Auto-Owners Mutual) defended the case
and agreed it would be obligated to pay any judgment entered.
Defendants

(through Auto-Owners Mutual) moved for summary

judgment, arguing that Neubauers' insurer was "precluded as a
matter of law from exercising any subrogation rights against a
tenant."

485 N.W.2d at 88. The trial court rejected Hostetters'

argument concluding they were not co-insureds under Neubauers' fire
insurance policy, and judgment was thereafter entered in favor of
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plaintiffs and against Ms. Hostetter.

Ms. Hostetter appealed, and

the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed.
Although it was clear Ms. Hostetter was not a named insured
under the Farmers Mutual fire policy, she argued on appeal that she
was an implied co-insured based on the rationale of Sutton v.
Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478 (Okla. App. 1975).

The Iowa Supreme Court

acknowledged the Sutton holding "that subrogation was not available
because a tenant is considered a co-insured of the landlord absent
an express agreement to the contrary" 485 N.W.2d at 88, and further
identified the four major public policy reasons relied upon in
Sutton for denying a subrogation claim against a tenant:

(1) the

landlord

in the

and

tenant

each have

an

insurable

interest

property; (2) the tenant pays for part of the insurance premium
with his rent; (3) tenants reasonably rely on the landlord to buy
fire insurance and to cover the tenant; and (4) equity requires the
insurer, not the tenant, to bear the risk of loss.
The Iowa Supreme Court noted, however, that, "[s]everal courts
have rejected Sutton and its progeny."

Id_. For example, Page v.

Scott, 263 Ark. 684, 567 S.W.2d 101 (1978), where the Arkansas
Supreme Court "rejected the 'fiction' that the tenant paid the
insurance premium as a part of the rent, finding instead that
market factors control the setting of rental prices."
at 89.

485 N.W.2d

The Arkansas Court further succinctly identified those

circumstances where subrogation would not be allowed:

^ince Mr. Hostetter was not at fault for starting the fire, the claims against him were dismissed.
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Appellee contends, however, that a
lessor's insurer has no subrogation to
lessor's claim against the lessee.
This
undoubtedly would be true if the parties had
agreed as part of the transaction that
insurance would be provided for the mutual
protection of the parties. . . . It would
also be true if such an agreement could be
implied from the terms of the agreement
between the parties. Such an agreement has
been implied when the terms of the lease
require the landlord to carry insurance at the
expense of the tenant, when the tenant's
contractual obligation to return the leased
property in good condition excepts loss by
fire and when the agreement requires the
lessor to carry insurance and use the proceeds
for restoration of the property insured.
567 S.W.2d at 103 (emphasis added).

As previously noted, none of

these circumstances exist in the instant case.
The Neubauer court further examined the issue by reviewing 6A
J. Appleman, Insurance Law St Practice § 4055 (1991 Supp.), wherein
Appleman criticized what he perceived as "the modern trend . . . to
find . . .
Sutton."

a tenant is a co-insured based on the rationale in

485 N.W. at 89. Quoting from Appleman, Neubauer stated:
Sutton, the leading modern case denying
subrogation of lessees, cites no cases for the
proposition that the lessee is a co-insured of
the lessor, comparable to a permissive user
under an auto insurance policy. Contrary to
the court's statements, the fact both parties
had insurable interests does not make them coinsureds. The insurer has a right to choose
whom it will insure and it did not choose to
insure the lessees, and under this holding the
lessee could have sued the insurer for loss
due to damage to the realty, e.g., loss of use
if policy provides such coverage.
Cases
following Sutton, however, have at least
impliedly
restricted
the
co-insurance
relationship to one limited solely to the
purpose of prohibiting subrogation.
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Id. (emphasis added) Having considered the various positions,
the Iowa Supreme Court rejected Hostetter's argument that she was
a co-insured.

The court stated:

Consistent with the views expressed in the
Appleman treatise, we also do not accept the
rationale that the tenant has propounded in
the present case. It is based on the theory
that, because the whole is equal to the sum of
its parts, fire insurance on an entire dwelling includes the interest of both landlord and
tenant as a matter of law.
This argument
disregards the fact that these are separate
estates capable of being separately valued and
separately insured. To the extent that defendant and her husband also had a property
interest in the dwelling, it was not automatically insured under the landlords' policy.
There is nothing in the present record to suggest that the proceeds paid to the Neubauers
by Farmers Mutual exceeded the value of the
landlords' reversionary interest in the property.
Even if such evidence existed, this
would only establish an over-evaluation by the
insurer of the landlords' loss.
485 N.W.2d at 89-90.

The court further noted, analogous to

the holding in Fashion Place Inv., that it might have reached a
different result " [i]f the landlords had agreed to insure the
tenants' interest in the property. . .."
Neubauer properly identifies the fallacies associated with
Sutton's blanket conclusion that a tenant is a co-insured simply
because he is a tenant.

As noted, the Hostetters had their ov/n

insurance policy covering personal liability as well as their own
personal property. In the instant case, Fullmer is insured through
his parents' home owner's policy for liability.

Sutton and its

progeny erroneously surmise that allowing a subrogation claim
against a tenant effectively requires the property to be double
18

insured against fire by the landlord and the tenant.

This is

clearly not the case.
Moreover, for some inexplicable

reason, Sutton

finds it

inequitable to hold a tenant responsible for his own negligent
acts.

Such a conclusion runs counter to the basic premises

underlying common law negligence and tort theory.
Furthermore, cases which are perceived by some to follow
Sutton, in many instances are factually distinguishable or simply
do not hold that tenant status alone makes one a co-insured.
example, that was not the holding in Fashion Place Inv.

For

In Safeco

Insurance Companies v. Weisgerber, 767 P.2d 271 (Idaho 1989), and
Rizzuto v. Morris, supra, the leases specifically excepted the
tenant from liability for fire damage.

In Rizzuto the court

focused on the intent of the parties. In addition to the specific
exculpatory language in the lease exempting the tenant from fire
damage liability, there was evidence the landlord expressly told
the tenant at least two times that he had fire insurance on the
building when the tenant asked about insurance.
exist in the instant case.

No such facts

In Alaska Insurance Co. v. RCA Alaska

Communications, 623 P.2d 1216 (Alaska 1981), the court narrowly
stated its holding as follows:
Therefore, we hold that if the landlord
in a commercial lease covenants to maintain
fire insurance on the leased premises, and the
lease does not otherwise clearly establish the
tenant's liability for fire loss caused by its
own negligence, by reserving to the landlord's
insurer the right to subrogate against the
tenant, the tenant is, for the limited purpose
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of defeating the insurer's subrogation claim,
an implied co-insured of its landlord.
623 P.2d at 1220 (emphasis added).

Obviously RCA Alaska Commun.

does not support the proposition that tenant status alone makes one
a co-insured.

Yet even this limited holding creates the strange

result that a landlord could recover uninsured losses from his
tenant in the same case in which the insurer's subrogation claim is
disallowed.
Also, although in Safeco Insurance Co. v. Capri, 705 P. 2d 659
(Nev. 1985), subrogation was denied, the facts showed the landlord
expressly agreed to maintain fire insurance on the property.
Sutton's position that the tenant is a co-insured under the
landlord's fire policy because they both have insurable interests
in the same property is factually incorrect. If Fullmer indeed had
any "insurable" interest, it encompassed nothing more than one
apartment. Yet there is no indication damage was confined to that
single apartment.
Adopting the Sutton rationale would effectively eliminate
subrogation by a landlord's insurer against a tenant unless there
was an agreement to the contrary.
However, even Sutton's apparent exception to the blanket rule
barring

subrogation

where

one can

show

an

agreement

to the

contrary, is an illusory notion, as a practical matter. What type
of agreement would satisfy Sutton?

Would an agreement making the

tenant responsible for the damages he causes be sufficient? If so,
the lease between Garbett and Fullmer contains such a provision.
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The lease specifically states that the property shall not be
destroyed.

Yet, such an express agreement is unnecessary for a

landlord to hold a tenant responsible for damages negligently
caused by the tenant. The tenant is responsible for such damage as
a matter of common law, Cluff v. Culmer, supra.

Thus, such an

agreement expressly written into the lease gives a landlord no more
rights than he has as a matter of common law.

Presumably, such

language would not constitute Man agreement to the contrary" under
Sutton.
Sutton would probably allow subrogation if the lease contained
language specifically stating that tenants are not co-insureds
under any fire insurance policy purchased by the landlord on the
property.
being

The prospect, as a practical matter, of such language

included

in a typical

apartment

lease

is almost nil.

Specifically, the Garbett-Fullmer lease says nothing whatsoever
about insurance.

If neither party even addresses the issue of

insurance, how could there ever be an agreement between the parties
contrary to Sutton's holding that a tenant is a co-insured simply
because he is a tenant.

Thus, Sutton's exception to the blanket

rule of co-insured status for tenants, although it perhaps sounds
fair, has no substance.
Moreover, the concept that a negligent party is only responsible for his negligence if he expressly so agrees turns traditional
tort law upside down.

Indeed, Utah law does not allow a negligent

party to avoid responsibility for his conduct in the context of an
indemnity agreement unless the agreement clearly and unequivocally
21

expresses the indemnitor's intent to indemnify the indemnitee for
his own negligence. See Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co. , 793 P.2d
362 (Utah 1990) .
Page v. Scott, supra, also addressed and rejected the policy
argument that allowing subrogation gives the insurer a windfall:
[W]e
are
not
persuaded
by
appellee's
[windfall] argument . . . . The same might be
said about a recovery from a third party
liable because of negligently causing a fire.
It also could be said of the insurer affording
collision coverage to an automobile owner
suffering damage from the negligent acts of
another.
We have never recognized the
validity of such an argument.
567 P.2d at 104 (emphasis added).

This court should reject

the so-called public policy arguments advanced by Sutton and other
courts against allowing subrogation.

The three circumstances set

forth in the Utah cases are more than sufficient to protect tenants
from improper subrogation claims, without emasculating the entire
principle of subrogation in the landlord-tenant context.
POINT II.
PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 OF THE HOUSTON AFFIDAVIT
ARE RELEVANT AND THERE WAS ADEQUATE FOUNDATION
FOR ADMISSION.
The trial court struck paragraphs 5 and 6 of David Houston's
affidavit finding they were either not relevant or not made upon
personal knowledge.

Paragraphs 5 and 6 were presented to address

Sutton's public policy argument that allowing subrogation would
result in the property being double insured for fire.

Houston

showed through his affidavit that renter's insurance is available
to cover a tenant for personal liability, as well as to cover the
22

tenant's personal property.

His statements were made based upon

his personal knowledge and experience
superintendent

with

extensive

as a State Farm claim

experience

involving

provided by homeowners and fire insurance policies.

coverage

[R. 217-18,

255-56]
Even though the trial court struck paragraphs 5 and 6, the
court nonetheless held that no affidavit was necessary for State
Farm to establish and argue the availability of renter's insurance
to cover personal property and liability of a tenant. In the event
this Court agrees that no affidavit is necessary then Garbett's
objection to the court's striking of paragraphs

5 and

6 is

withdrawn.
Garbett raises this point in the brief simply to preserve his
rights

in case this Court determines

an affidavit

regarding

availability of renter's insurance is necessary. Garbett believes
the trial court is correct in its conclusion that no affidavit is
necessary.

Numerous references

in various cases to renter's

insurance show without question that such insurance is available to
insure tenants against their own personal liability.
Hostetter, supra, is a clear example of this.

Neubauer v.

Other cases which

make reference to the availability of renter's insurance as a
matter of course include Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Mardanlou, 607 P.2d 291 (Utah 1980); Morales v. Fansler, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 96 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. 1989); Smith v. Sellers, 747 P.2d 15
(Colo. App. 1987).
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POINT III,
PORTIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 5 OF FULLMER! S
MAY 14, 1992 AFFIDAVIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN
STRICKEN.
Fullmer submitted his May 14, 1992, affidavit for the purpose
of establishing a fact issue which would preclude the court from
granting summary judgment in favor of Garbett.

Fullmer theorized

that if the court granted Garbett's motion, it would imply an
obligation on the tenant to purchase insurance. Garbett obviously
disagrees with that theory.

He never argued that Fullmer was

required to purchase insurance on the apartment building.

If this

court reverses the trial court's grant of summary judgment for
Fullmer, it should order the trial court to enter partial summary
judgment, as requested, in favor of Garbett. There is no reason to
find any material fact issue based on Fullmer's affidavit.
The underlying premise of Fullmer's argument is that it would
be unfair to allow a subrogation claim against him presumably
because he has no insurance to cover the claim. Obviously, this is
incorrect. First, allowing the subrogation claim does not obligate
him to purchase fire insurance for the entire building.

Second,

the facts show Fullmer is insured for this liability through his
parents' homeowner's policy.

To argue unfairness under these

circumstances is specious.
Fullmer's affidavit supposedly establishes his reasonable
expectation that the landlord would provide fire insurance on the
building.

His statements in paragraphs 3 and 5 are based on

hindsight, and are not statements of his actual state of mind at
24

the time he entered the lease.

The language of his affidavit was

"I would have expected that the owner would have his own insurance
of whatever type he felt necessary," and "I would have expected
that the owner would have insurance in the event this occurred."
[R. 144-45] (emphasis added)

Significantly, Fullmer1s affidavit

does not state that he reasonably

expected

Garbett to carry

insurance which would cover Fullmer for his own negligent acts.
Fullmer's affidavit does not meet the requirements for affidavits
under Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P., but is instead simply a reflection of
his opinions and conclusions after the fact. Such is not adequate.
See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983).
Finally, Fullmer's statement of his reasonable expectations
under the lease is not a basis to create a material fact issue in
any event.

In Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins., 839 P.2d

798 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court rejected the "reasonable
expectation" doctrine in interpreting coverage under an insurance
policy. The same rationale should apply to the lease agreement in
this case.
The Court of Appeals can order the trial court to enter
summary judgment in favor of Garbett because no material issues of
fact preclude such.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should reverse the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Fullmer and denial of summary judgment
for Garbett.

The Court should allow State Farm's subrogation

action to be maintained

against Fullmer under the facts and
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circumstances of this case and should order the trial court to
enter partial summary judgment in favor of Garbett and against
Fullmer on the issue of liability and causation of damages and
remand for a trial or other appropriate hearing solely for the
determination of the exact amount of damages.
DATED this

/ Ip "" day of d~*

1993.
STRONG & HANNI

By

J^tA^fA/
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Stuart H. Schultz
H. Burt Ringwood
Attorneys for Appellant:
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ADDENDUM INDEX
1.

Rules and Statutes

2.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment dated
August 18, 1992.

3. Bryson Garbett's Notice of Appeal dated September 3, 1992.
4.

Affidavit of David K. Houston dated July 20, 1992.

5. Affidavit of Brad Fullmer dated May 14, 1992.
6.

Order Regarding Motions to Strike dated August 18, 1992.

ADDENDUM 1

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A partv seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversv, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented oi opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories
or further affidavits When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided m this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided m this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial If he does not so respond, summary mdement, if appropriate, shall be entered against him
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present bv
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidav.ts presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt
Compiler's Notes — This rule is similar
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31A-21-108. S u b r o g a t i o n actions.
Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer m the name of its insured
histor\ C 1953, 31A 21 108, e n a c t e d b \
L. 1986 ch 204, § 141

Lffectivc Oat* s
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FILED
>! DiST~iC7 COURT
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BY

Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GNS PARTNERSHIP; BRYSON
GARBETT; JAN GARBETT; DAVID
NIPPER; BETTY NIPPER; WHITE
WATER CORPORATION, and BRIAN
STEPHENSEN, Partners,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs

Civil No. 910500012

BRAD FULLMER,

Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant.

This matter was before the court pursuant to competing Motions
for Summary Judgment.

The court, having considered the pleadings

on file, the Memorandum submitted with respect to the Motion, and
the argument of counsel on July 22, 1992, the court makes the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT
The court finds that the following facts are not disputed:
1.

On February 9, 1988, Brad Fullmer ("Fullmer") signed a

rental agreement with plaintiffs (hereinafter collectively referred

to as "Garbett" or "Landlord) which permitted Fullmer to reside as

a tenant in Apartment A6 of The Wedge Apartments for the winter and
spring quarters of 1987-88 school year in St. George, Utah.

The

rental agreement attached to plaintiff' s Memorandum dated April 21,
1992, is a true and correct copy of said rental agreement.
2.

Under paragraph 1(b) of the lease, Fullmer agreed that:
Each tenant shall be responsible for all
damages within their apartment on a joint and
several basis.

3.

Under paragraph 4 of the lease, Fullmer agreed that:
No . . destruction of property (landlord' s or
tenant's) shall be permitted on the premises
(apartments, parking lot, sidewalk or lawns).

4.

The lease contained no terms or language which required

the landlord to purchase fire insurance on the apartments.
5.

On February 22, 1988, while residing as a tenant in The

Wedge Apartments, Fullmer used a Hibachi barbecue at approximately
12: 00 noon on the balcony of Apartment A6.
6.

Following the noon barbecue on February 22, 1988, Fullmer

left the coals in the Hibachi.
7.

At approximately 7:00 p.m. on February 22, 1988, Fullmer

prepared the same Hibachi for another barbecue on the balcony of
Apartment A6.

In the process, Fullmer dumped the coals remaining

in the Hibachi from the noon barbecue in a cardboard box located in
the balcony closet.
8.

At approximately 1: 00 a. m. on February 23, 1988, a fire
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started in the storage area of Apartment A6.

The fire was started

by the smoldering coals and ashes negligently placed in the storage
closet by Fullmer.
9.

Plaintiffs

insured The Wedge Apartments

against fire

losses through State Farm Fire & Casualty Company.
10.

The insurance policy does not include tenants either as

named insureds or as insureds by definition.
11.

State

Farm

paid

for the

fire

loss

suffered

by

plaintiff in t M s case in an amount in excess of $70, 000. 00.

the
This

action was brought as a subrogation claim against Fullmer pursuant
to contractual rights provided under Section I and Section II,
General Condition No, 7 of the insurance policy.
12.
insurance.

The lease between the parties is silent on the issue of
There was no discussion between the parties to the

lease regarding insurance.
13.

The lease provides in part that:
It is the intent of the landlord and their
managers to keep The Wedge in superior
condition.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The fire which was the subject of this action was caused

by Fullmer7 s negligence.
2.

There was privity of contract between the landlords and

Fullmer with respect to the lease agreement.
3

3.

Where the lease between these parties was silent with

respect to insurance or any obligation to provide insurance, the
court concludes, based upon the authority of Fashion Place Inv. v.
Salt Lake County. 776 P. 2d 941 (Utah App. 1989) that the defendantlessee Fullmer is presumed to be a co-insured under the landlord1 s
fire insurance policy and therefore no subrogation action may be
prosecuted against the tenant Fullmer.
DATED this

J 0

day of August, 1992.

_

^

BY THE COURT:

HQ&J^Cable

Approved as to form:

Stuart Schultz
Strong & Hanni
Attorney for Plaintiff
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* James L. Shumate

MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the

J ? day of

August, 1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed,
postage fully prepaid, to the following:

Stuart Schultz
H. Burt Ringwood
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GNS PARTNERSHIP; BRYSON
GARBETT; JAN GARBETT; DAVID
NIPPER; BETTY NIPPER; WHITE
WATER CORPORATION, and BRIAN
STEPHENSEN, Partners,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs

Civil No. 910500012

BRAD FULLMER,

Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant.
•

*

*

This matter came before the court on July 22, 1992 pursuant to
competing

Motions

for

Summary

Judgment.

The

court,

having

previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and
having made its ruling in oper court, hereby
ORDERS,

ADJUDGES AND

DECREES

that plaintiffs'

Motion

for

Summary Judgment is denied, defendant' s Motion for Summary Judgment
is granted, and plaintiff s claims against the defendant be and
hereby are dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits.
DATED this

/f

day of August, 1992.
BY THE COURT

Approved as to form:

MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the

I j)

day of

August, 1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed,
postage fully prepaid, to the following:

Stuart Schultz
H. Burt Ringwood
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Stuart H. Schultz #2886
H. Burt Ringwood #5787
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7080
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GNS PARTNERSHIP; BRYSON
GARBETT; JAN GARBETT; DAVTD
NIPPER; BETTY NIPPER; WHITE
WATER CORPORATION, and BRIAN
STEPHENSEN, Partners,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiffs
and Appellants,
vs
BRAD FULLMER,
Defendant
and Appellee.

Civil No. 910500012
Judge James L. Shumate

Pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, plaintiffs and appellants, GNS Partnership, Bryson
Garbett, Jan Garbett, David Nipper, Betty Nipper, White Water
Corporation, and Brian Stephensen, Partners, hereby give notice
that they appeal the judgment entered August 18/ 1992, by the
Honorable James L. Shumate, District Judge.

109093
1109-649

This appeal is taken

from the Fifth Judicial District Court of Was^...:on County,
State of Utah, to the Utah Supreme Court,
DATED this

3

^

day of September, 1992.
STRONG & HANNI

By

/JTZv^4
Stuart H. Schultz
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed, postage prepaid, on
September

^

, 199 2, to the following:

Keith W. Meade
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal
525 East 100 South #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

£^7 .
^

f ATb OP UTAH
)<
-OUNTY OF WASHINGTON)'
, true copy of the ortfl^ <secum*K'» m

109093
1109-649

&

ADDENDUM 4

r- .

r

--,

.'/. r

'92 JUL
23

COURT

RPI S 58
- -HTY

BY (\

Stuart H. Schultz #2886
H. Burt Ringwood #5787
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-7080
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GNS PARTNERSHIP; BRYSON
GARBETT; JAN GARBETT; DAVID
NIPPER; BETTY NIPPER; WHITE
WATER CORPORATION, AND BRIAN
STEPHENSEN, Partners,

]
])
;)
]
]

AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K. HOUSTON

Plaintiffs,
vs.

]

BRAD FULLMER,

Civil No. 910500012
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
County of Utah

)
)
)

]1

Judge James L. Shumate

ss.

I, DAVID K. HOUSTON, do state as follows:
1.

I am a claim superintendent for State Farm Fire and

Casualty Company and have held this position for

5

have extensive experience with the coverage provided by
homeowners and fire insurance policies.

years. I

2.

I have supervisory responsibility for the above-

referenced subrogation claim.
3.

I have personal knowledge that State Farm's subrogation

claim was submitted to Prudential Insurance Company, the home
owner's insurer for Brad Fullmer, through his parents' home
owner's policy with Prudential.
4.

At no time did Prudential notify me that Brad Fullmer

did not have liability coverage under his parents' policy.
5.

Homeowners insurance policies generally extend

liability coverage for children of the homeowners who are living
away from home as students.
6.

I have personal knowledge that State Farm Fire and

Casualty writes and sells rental insurance for tenants which
provides first-party coverage for personal property and liability
coverage for damage caused by the tenant by fire to the apartment
complex they live in.

However, Brad Fullmer, as a student living

away from home, would have been covered for liability under his
parents' homeowners policy, and would not have needed a separate
renters liability policy.
Further affiant saith not.

2

DATED this

2 0th

day of July, 1992.

DAVID K. HOUSTON

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

3L/^

day of July,

1992 by DAVID K. HOUSTON.

^Ux

VU >UO>

A

/ ^ v fr >

^

Notary Public
^
-^
Residing at
LLX - L&+-^«^^
My C o m m i s s ^ a t
/"$V

I

Cctnm.
X£
a3.2-24-30—»
DEMN«S L JAMES
278 No 2420 W. i *
Frovo,UT
A

3

ADDENDUM 5

Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

*

GNS PARTNERSHIP; BRYSON
GARBETT; JAN GARBETT; DAVID
NIPPER; BETTY NIPPER; WHITE
WATER CORPORATION, and BRIAN
STEPHENSEN, Partners,

*

*

*

*

)
AFFIDAVIT OF
BRAD FULLMER

)
)

Plaintiffs,

)

vs

)

BRAD FULLMER,

Civil No. 910500012

) Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant.

)
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Brad Fullmer, upon oath, states as follows:
1.

I am the defendant in this action.

I have personal

knowledge of the matters set forth hereinafter.
2.

To the best of my knowledge, the lease agreement attached

hereto as Exhibit "A" was the lease that I signed to live at the
Wedge Apartments.

I did not negotiate the terms of the lease.

was on a printed form.

It

The apartment was a furnished apartment

that I shared with other students at Dixie College.

I was 20 years

of age at the time I signed the lease.
3.

At no time did the owner or any person tell me that I

needed to or should obtain insurance of any type on the structure

or property at the Wedge Apartments.

This was never discussed, nor

did I understand that it could possibly be required.

I would have

expected that the owner would have his own insurance of whatever
type he felt necessarv.
4.

I never understood paragraph 1(b) of the lease to require

me to obtain insurance.
insurance.

That paragraph does not mention the word

The lease made no mention of insurance.

I understood

from paragraph 1(b) that if furniture or fixtures were damaged in
the apartment as a result of abuse or roughhousing, that we would
be responsible to replace those items.

I never understood that if

the

result

apartment

building

burned

as

a

of

something

that

happened in our apartment, that I would have to pay for the entire
building.

When I moved out of the apartments after the fire, the

owners never advised me that I owed them any additional amount.

No

demand was made upon me by the owners or the apartment manager to
pay for the damages caused by the fire.
5.
11

I understood paragraph 4 of the lease, which addresses

disorderly, immoral or unlawful conduct of any kind . . . " to mean

that I would have to adhere to standards of gentlemanly conduct and
that I could be asked to move from the apartments if my conduct
fell below these standards.

I never understood from paragraph 4 of

the lease that if the apartments burned, that I would be required
to pay

the

cost

of

rebuilding

the apartments.
2

I would

have

expected that the owner would have insurance in the event this
occurred.

No one ever requested or even suggested that I obtain my

own insurance on the structure.
DATED this

H

day of May, 1992.

E^T&d^F u l l m e r

STATE OF UTAH
ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
S u b s c r i b e d and s w o r n t o b e f o r e me t h i s

/</

day of May,

1992.

7My/< ,•

Wos)

('M#t a r y T?ubl i c

My Commission Expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC
PYPER STIVERS

Residing

|
j

525 £ast 100 South #500
.alt Lake City, Utah 341C2 i
Mv Commission Expires
j
August 27 1P9C
I

STATE OF UTAH

I

3

at:

I CHO 1

HOME PH0N6 NUMBER
a 1\-Ory
HOME AOORESS
1A$U
\uin
***iA*?f.J.
(S
Name of Parent or Guardian
This agreement is made and entered into this

w/Uf
]

(City)'

day ol

"•»*

(State)

(Zip)

^ b e t w e e n the above named tenant and The Wedge Premier

Student Housing ("The Wedge" of the "Landlord")
The landlord will provide the following service at The Wedge
UTILITIES Water, sewer and garbage collection
SERVICES Vacuums off street parking and mail boxes
HOUSING You are assigned Unit $f\(^
This is subject to change

A (

^
'

J

Tenant is contracting for housing at The Wedge tor the school year 19 ^ jo include FALL WINTER and SPRING QUARTERS This is an agreement to
pay % 7 7 0 "

f o f sa,<

^

nous,n

9 P | u s deposit

<f{

'

""

Tenant will meet the following payment schedule lor the housing contract period
DEPOSIT $1j)0 00 to be paid at the time of application for housing
RENT $ 3 0 * ) - p£fl QUARTER (All rent is due and payable as indicated 10 days before the first day of classroom instruction for the indicated
quarter If rent Has not been paid 10 days before classroom instruction begins landlord may assume you are not going to stay at The Wedge and. at its
option may assign your space to someone else No room may be occupied unless rent is paid in full but failure to occupy premises does not negate
tenants obligation to pay under this lease There is a SI 50 per day late fee for rents not paid on time Rents must be paid quarterly in advance NO
MONTHLY PAYMENTS!
Landlord's mailing address is

The Wedge 335 So 1000 E

St George Utah

84770

Tenant hereby agrees to abide by the following rules and regulations
1

The landlord or its managers shall retain the right of entry at any time WITHOUT NOTICE to any apartment unit for the purpose of inspecting
the premises
L
Each apartment may be inspected on a weekly basis to check for general cleanliness and to determine the extent of any damaged or lost
items provided by the landlord Each apartment is to be kept clean and presentable at all times Tenant will be given notice of these
inspections Management may also hold one unscheduled inspection during each quarter If your apartment is unclean, has suffered any
damage to premises furniture or fixtures and ts missing any furniture or fixtures tenant will be given 24 hour notice to correct the problem
area Failure to make the needed corrections will result in all members of the apartment receiving thereafter a 24 hour notice to vacate the
premises
A Each tenant shall be responsible (or ail damage within their apartment on a joint and several basis Repairs or replacement of damaged
items shall be made first from the collective deposits of all tenants within the apartment unit and, if necessary for an assessment for
additional repair or replacement expenses to the tenants not covered by the deposes Refunds shall be made on a pro-rate basis' with each
tenant in the unit sharing equally tn repair or replacement cost for the unit Any repainting or other redecoration of the units shall not be
allowed without prior written consent of the landlord

2

No guest shall occupy tn any fashion 2nd at any lime an apartment without the prior written approval of the landlord Guests lodged may be
subject to a fee as determined by the landlord payable at the time permission is given Guests are subject to all housing regulations and the
tenants m the unit housing such guest will be held jointly and severally responsible for any breach of regulations or for any damage caused by
said guest All guests not given permission by landlord to occupy a unit shall leave the apartments no later than 12 00 p m Sun - Thurs, & 2 00
a m Fn - Sat

3

Quiet hours begin at 10 00 p m After th.s time loud and boisterous talking runnu g on walks or other noise that cause any manner of
disturbance or nuisance shall cease Even though quiet hours do not begin until 10 00 p 1,1 students are expected to respect the rights of other
students to privacy and quiet Students or guests are expected to knock before entering any aprtment or room other than their own NO
MEMBER OF THE OPPOSITE SEX IS ALLOWEO IN THE BEDROOM BATHROOM OR HALL AREAS! While there are no -dorm" hours
students are expected to leave and enter quietly after the 10 00 p m quiet hour No guests are allowed in any apartments alter 12 00 p m Sun
Thurs & 2 00 a m Fn Sat

4

DISORDERLY IMMORAL OR UNLAWFUL conduct of any kind whatsoevens forbidden No obscene pictures alcohol drugs tobacco or chewing tobacco loul
or abusive language loud ot boisterous conduct o< destruction of property (Landlord s or tenants s) shall be permitted on the pr«mi<es (apartments parting tot
sidewalks or lawns) Violation ol any ol the above will result in the immediate termination ol tenant s rental agreement and mandatory vacation of the apartment
within 24 hours There are no exceptions to this rule Any tenant whose conduct in the sole opinion of the landlord is detrimental to The Wedge and/or its other
residents shall vacate the premises within 24 hours of notice by landlord DEPOSITS AND RENTS WILL p c FORFEITED'

5

Each tenant agrees to the respecKui use ot all facilities provided by the landlord and to respect the privac/ a

8

If the room shows no wear or damage beyond normal use is properly cleaned and all light bulbs are working the tenant may at the end of the contract period
receive a refund of lt\c cleaning and security deposit less carpet cleaning and excess electricity charges Charges to deposit could be as follows $10 00 per
quarter for carpet cleaning wear and tear and light bulbs etc Deposits are refunded 30 days after a written request for a refund has been received with proper
forwarding address If the student leaves before the end of the school year no refund of the deposit will be allowed No refunds will be made to tenants who have
breached the rules and regulations contained herein

7

One key to each apartment s mail box will be provided for a $10 00 deposit This key may be duplicated If said key is returned the $10 00 deposit will be
refunded

I

No change of apartment or roommate assignments may be made without the prior written c*
roommates shall be mmediately and privately discussed with the landlord

0

From tim* to time it may be neceswrv to move one or more tenants to another apartment to accommoda.e remodeling and to achieve maximum occupancy per
unit Management does not intend to do any such sruttling but reserves the riyiu 10 thaiu^ dparimem a^ignmcrts if necessary Each \**™\ w ,n poi if *i v t
possible be separated from those he o< she chooses to room with

10

A late fee of $ I 50 per day will be charged tor 'er ts net recieved 10 days belore the first diy v.* cla srorn instructions for -ach quarter Each lensni agrees to
pay a fee of $15 00 if his or he( rent check is dishonored and shall rep/ace such dishonored evek *ith cash certified check or money order

II

The Wedge shall provide each apartment with beds couch chair and dinette set You may add your OWT
cover or bed pad for his or her bed (twin) Sleeping on a bed without a prober mattress cover will result u
each apartment are to provide their own shower curtains You will also need your own dishes pes

properly of the other tenants

ent of the landlord All complaints or problems concerning

„S desired Each tenant shall bring a mattress
ture of the tenant s deposit The members ol
ersonal linens

12

Oue to the nature of the student housing no car washing oil changing or any other mechanical work on cars will be allowed in the parking lot or property

13

Large groups of friends are not to be invited to nor are largt parties to be held on the premises or in the apartments

14

No animals or pt\t of any kind will be alfowed on tht premises or m the apartments

15

The unit* may b« occupied 10 days prior to the first day ol classroom instojction II a tenant desires to move in earlier he or she may do so with permission of the
Landlord and upon payment ol a fee ol $5*00 ptt day per tenant

11

Any tenant who is given notice to vacate the premises by the Landlord for any reason whatsoever shall not be entitled to a refund of his or her deposit or rent
Names of all such persons wilt be submitted to Otxie College as well as to their parents
H is the Intent of the Landlord and their managers lo keep The Wedge in superior condition Please report any problems to management as soom as Ihey occur
In (he event any portion of this lease if found to be unenforceable or void at law and equity the remaining portions hereof shall not be effected thereby and shall
remain in full force and affect

EXHIBIT - k

CONTRACTUALLY AGREED TO THE LANOLI .

Tenant's signature

r^N

fl-d/

RIGHT AS OUTLINED ABOVE.

'

\ \U/

>

U f

^

.

/

Landlord's approving sidhafure
PARENTS* GUARANTEE: Because of the nature of Junior College Housing, we are usually providing a student with his or her first experience with tenant/landlord
relationships. Although most students handle this wiJi. some have problems. As the parent or guardian of t u above-contracting tenant, by signing below you indicate
that you understand the above agreement and will be responsible for the guarantee the perlormance by said tenant of all of his or her obligations under this agreement.

Parent or Guardian signature

Oate

MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the

) /

day of ^4ay7

1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage
fully prepaid, to the following:
Stuart Schultz
H. Burt Ringwood
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Lh&

da/fulImer aff

4

ADDENDUM 6

COPY

Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Defendant

rece
S --£/-

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GNS PARTNERSHIP; BRYSON
GARBETT; JAN GARBETT; DAVID
NIPPER; BETTY NIPPER; WHITE
WATER CORPORATION, and BRIAN
STEPHENSEN, Partners,

ORDER REGARDING
MOTIONS TO STRIKE

Plaintiffs,
vs

Civil No. 910500012

BRAD FULLMER,

Judge James L. Shumate

Defendant.

This matter came before the court for hearing on July 22,
19 92, pursuant to competing Motions for Summary Judgment.
plaintiff was represented by counsel Stuart Schultz.

The

Defendant was

represented by counsel Keith W. Meade.
The court has entered a separate Order with respect to the
Motion for Summary Judgment.

During the course of the proceeding,

the court considered and ruled upon the plaintiff s objection dated
July 1, 1992 to the Affidavit of Brad Fullmer, said affidavit being
dated May 14, 1992.

A second Motion to Strike the Affidavit of

David Houston was filed by the defendant and was made at the time
of the hearing.

The affidavit had been sent by telefax to the

court on July 21 with the original being filed on July 22 during
the arguments.
The court/ having considered the Affidavits and the Motions or
Obj ections, hereby
ORDERS as follows:
1.

BTfrfl F u U m Q ? AJgftflgvJlt; pnfl P3,jdrQUf f' *? QfrlegUQPt

plaintiff's

objection to the Affidavits

Affidavit is received as filed.

is

overruled

The

and the

The court believes that it can

winnow out any language which might be inadmissible as evidence.
The court further observes that this affidavit had no bearing on
the court' s ultimate ruling.
2.

David

Houston Affidavit.

The

court

finds

that the

Affidavit was not offered with respect to the determination of
liability.

Statements set forth in paragraphs 1, 2,

the Affidavit are received.

3, and 4 of

Statements set forth in paragraphs 5

and 6 are stricken, in part upon the basis that they are not made
upon personal knowledge and are not material or relevant to the
proceedings.

By striking these paragraphs, the Court remains

mindful that renter' s insurance is available and plaintiffs do not
need an affidavit

to establish

and

argue the availability

of

renter' s insurance to cover personal property owned by an insured
and liability.

2

DATED this

lb

day of August, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

H o i ^ a ^ % ^ a m e s \ \L\ /sMmate
Di s t i^uct\ (Juiige"^

Approved as to form:

Stuart Schultz
Strong & Hanni
Attorney for Plaintiffs

MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the

, j5

day of

August, 1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed,
postage fully prepaid, to the following:

Stuart Schultz
H. Burt Ringwood
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

hhj
da/f uIlmer2.ord

3

